Retired Lt. Gen. Keith Kellogg has called for the United States to deploy ground troops to seize Kharg Island, Iran’s vital oil export hub in the Persian Gulf. His proposal centers on a straightforward strategic calculation: controlling Kharg Island would give the U.S. command over Iran’s oil outflow and secure the Strait of Hormuz, effectively breaking Tehran’s control over global energy flows.
This article examines why Kellogg and other military strategists view this island as a critical leverage point, what’s already happened militarily in the region, the practicality of such an operation, public opinion on the proposal, and what the Trump administration’s current stance actually is. The debate over Kharg Island represents a larger question about how far U.S. military strategy should go to constrain Iranian influence. With U.S. Central Command having conducted major bombing raids on the island in March 2026 and additional Marines deployed to the region, the conversation has moved beyond theoretical strategy into operational planning. Understanding Kellogg’s reasoning and the military realities involved is essential for grasping where this potential conflict could head.
Table of Contents
- Who Is Keith Kellogg and What Exactly Is He Proposing?
- Why Would Controlling an Oil Island Give the U.S. Strategic Advantage?
- What Has Actually Happened on Kharg Island Recently?
- What Would It Actually Take to Seize and Hold Kharg Island?
- What Do Americans Actually Think About a Ground Operation in Iran?
- What Is the Trump Administration Actually Planning?
- Where Does This Likely Head?
- Conclusion
Who Is Keith Kellogg and What Exactly Is He Proposing?
Retired Lt. Gen. Keith Kellogg, a senior military strategist with decades of experience in defense and geopolitics, has become a prominent voice arguing for a more aggressive approach to Iran. His specific proposal involves deploying forces like the 82nd Airborne Division or Army Rangers to take and hold Kharg Island. The strategic logic is direct: Kharg Island is not merely a military installation—it’s the infrastructure through which Iran exports the vast majority of its oil, making it the economic lifeline of the Iranian government.
Kellogg’s reasoning draws on a proven principle of military strategy: control of critical infrastructure creates leverage. By seizing the island and its oil facilities, the U.S. would not only disrupt Iran’s primary source of foreign revenue but also establish a permanent position in the Persian Gulf capable of influencing global oil markets. This mirrors historical strategies like the British control of Suez or the Allied seizure of critical ports during major conflicts. However, there’s a crucial caveat: seizing an island is far easier than holding it against sustained resistance, which is why military specialists estimate approximately 5,000 troops would be needed not just to take Kharg Island, but to maintain control against counterattacks.

Why Would Controlling an Oil Island Give the U.S. Strategic Advantage?
The Persian Gulf has been the geographic center of global energy politics for nearly a century. The Strait of Hormuz, the narrow waterway through which roughly 20-25% of global oil passes, sits at the heart of this region. Kharg Island’s importance stems from both its physical location and its role as Iran’s primary export terminal. Control of the island would theoretically give whoever holds it the ability to monitor, regulate, or block Iranian oil shipments—and by extension, influence global oil prices and Iran’s ability to fund its military and government operations. From Kellogg’s perspective, this creates a form of economic pressure that doesn’t require ongoing military engagement across all of Iran.
Instead of fighting through the Iranian heartland, the U.S. could control a single strategic point and force Iran to negotiate or accept economic devastation. This is theoretically cleaner and more sustainable than occupation of a large territory. However, there’s a significant limitation to this logic: controlling an island doesn’t automatically control the Strait of Hormuz itself, and Iran retains the ability to harass shipping, close the strait through military action, or escalate through regional proxies. The U.S. would need not just control of Kharg Island but sustained naval dominance throughout the Persian Gulf—a much larger and more expensive commitment than the island operation alone.
What Has Actually Happened on Kharg Island Recently?
The theory moved closer to reality on March 13, 2026, when the U.S. Central Command conducted major bombing raids on Kharg Island’s military targets. President trump announced the strikes publicly, stating that “We’ve taken out everything but the pipes”—a reference to the oil infrastructure that would be worth controlling intact. These strikes weren’t exploratory or limited; they targeted Iranian military installations on the island and demonstrated that the U.S. military can reach and damage Kharg Island with precision.
This is an important data point because it shows the U.S. has both the capability and the operational freedom to strike the island without Iranian air defenses preventing the attack. The bombing campaign tested Iranian defenses and demonstrated American air superiority, but bombing is fundamentally different from ground occupation. An island can be struck from the air repeatedly, but holding territory against a motivated defender requires troops on the ground who can fight in close quarters, maintain logistics under fire, and resist counterattacks. The March 13 strikes essentially served as a proof of concept for American military reach while leaving the harder question—ground seizure and holding—unanswered.

What Would It Actually Take to Seize and Hold Kharg Island?
Military specialists estimate that approximately 5,000 troops would be required for a successful ground operation to take Kharg Island and hold it against Iranian counterattacks. This figure accounts for the assault force needed to overcome initial Iranian defenders, plus the garrison troops necessary to maintain control and logistics. For comparison, the initial invasion of Iraq in 2003 required roughly 150,000 troops to control a nation of 25 million people. Taking and holding a single island of several hundred square kilometers with an estimated 5,000 troops would be a much smaller operation in absolute numbers, but the density of defensive forces and supply lines would be much tighter. The 82nd Airborne Division or Army Rangers, which Kellogg specifically mentioned, are elite units capable of rapid deployment and high-intensity combat.
However, even elite units face time-to-failure constraints without proper logistics, air support, and reinforcements. If the U.S. seizes Kharg Island but Iran can rapidly mobilize reinforcements from the mainland, the American force could find itself under siege. The other trade-off is visibility: a ground operation is far more obvious and politically costly than an air campaign. Once American troops are on the island, the commitment becomes undeniable and withdrawal becomes a form of defeat.
What Do Americans Actually Think About a Ground Operation in Iran?
Public support for military action varies widely depending on the specifics, but one clear metric exists: only 7% of Americans support a potential ground operation in Iran, according to polling data. This represents one of the lowest support levels for any major military operation in recent American history. For comparison, even unpopular wars like Afghanistan had higher initial public support during their first few years.
The 7% figure suggests that Kellogg’s proposal, while strategically coherent to military minds, faces an enormous political barrier at home. This public opposition is a hard constraint on what any administration can actually do, regardless of military capability. A ground operation that kills American soldiers and costs billions would require either a major shift in public opinion triggered by a significant Iranian attack, or a president willing to pursue an unpopular war over sustained public opposition. The Trump administration appears acutely aware of this limitation, which is why their public positioning has emphasized capabilities (“the United States Military can take out Kharg Island at any time”) while carefully avoiding commitment (“Trump has no current plans to send troops”).

What Is the Trump Administration Actually Planning?
On March 20, 2026, Trump was reportedly considering blockading or occupying Kharg Island, according to multiple sources. A White House official stated that the U.S. military could take the island “at any time” but added a crucial qualifier: Trump has “no current plans to send troops” while retaining “all options as Commander-in-Chief.” This language is carefully chosen.
It keeps the military option on the table without triggering the domestic and international opposition that would come with a announced ground operation. The administration’s approach appears to be one of maximum pressure without maximum escalation—conducting air strikes to damage Iranian military capability, deploying additional forces (2,500 Marines were sent to the region in March 2026) to increase presence and deterrence, and maintaining the rhetorical threat of a ground operation without committing to it. This approach costs less in political capital and lives than an actual invasion, but it also doesn’t achieve the permanent control that Kellogg argues would be necessary for long-term leverage.
Where Does This Likely Head?
The trajectory suggests escalating pressure on Iran through air power and economic sanctions, combined with the maintained threat of ground operations if circumstances change. Any shift toward actual ground invasion would likely require either a major Iranian attack on American forces or allies, a dramatic change in public opinion, or a decision by the Trump administration to accept the political costs of an unpopular war. None of these are impossible, but none are currently in place.
The military infrastructure is being put in position: additional Marines in the Gulf, demonstrated bombing capability, and a chain of command that has clearly thought through a ground operation. This creates a situation where military action could escalate quickly if political conditions shifted. The call from strategists like Kellogg isn’t fringe military thinking—it’s a serious proposal from experienced officers—but it remains politically constrained by the tiny sliver of public support and the obvious human costs.
Conclusion
Keith Kellogg’s call for ground troops to seize Kharg Island is based on sound strategic reasoning about how controlling critical infrastructure creates leverage over adversaries. The American military has demonstrated it can strike the island and has the capability to seize it, and military specialists have calculated what it would take—roughly 5,000 troops to take and hold the position. However, the gap between military capability and political will remains enormous: only 7% of Americans support such an operation, and the Trump administration has explicitly stated it has no current plans for a ground invasion despite retaining the option.
The next months will likely see continued air strikes, increased military presence in the Gulf, and maintained rhetorical pressure on Iran, while the actual decision about ground operations remains contingent on either a major escalation by Iran or a significant shift in American public and political thinking. For now, Kharg Island represents a strategic objective that the U.S. military could seize but that political realities make unlikely to be seized in the near term.





