Iran power sits at the center of this dementia and brain health question.

Iran’s power structure has fundamentally shifted as the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) consolidated control following the death of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei on February 28, 2026. Khamenei, who ruled Iran for nearly four decades since the 1979 revolution, died in an airstrike that triggered the country’s largest succession crisis since its founding. The immediate aftermath saw Khamenei’s son Mojtaba installed into a position of authority on March 9, 2026, yet no formal Supreme Leader has been officially selected or announced—creating a dangerous power vacuum that the IRGC has effectively filled.

This article examines the current state of Iran’s leadership crisis, the role of the Revolutionary Guards in consolidating power, the massive human cost of the accompanying domestic crackdown, military strain within Iran’s armed forces, and the diplomatic tensions now playing out on the international stage. The Revolutionary Guards’ rise to supreme authority represents an unprecedented concentration of power within Iran’s military institution. Historically, while the IRGC held significant influence, the Supreme Leader remained the ultimate decision-maker. Today, with the succession still unresolved and Mojtaba’s status unclear, the IRGC effectively operates as the kingmaker and ultimate power broker in Iranian politics.

Who Are the Revolutionary Guards and Why Are They Now in Control?
The Leadership Vacuum and Succession Crisis
The Massive Human Cost of the Crackdown
Military Strain and Growing Institutional Friction
Economic Crisis Deepening Amid Power Struggle
International Response and Diplomatic Standoff
What Comes Next—Instability and Long-Term Risks
Conclusion

Who Are the Revolutionary Guards and Why Are They Now in Control?

The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps is Iran’s most powerful military institution, created immediately after the 1979 revolution specifically to protect the revolution’s ideological gains. The IRGC controls vast economic interests, including major industries, ports, and telecommunications networks, which gives it both financial independence from the state treasury and leverage over the civilian government. Unlike most militaries that operate under civilian control, the IRGC has always maintained ideological authority and direct influence over political decisions.

In the current crisis, the IRGC’s dominance has become explicit rather than implicit. With no Supreme Leader formally designated, the IRGC has essentially become the institution through which all major power flows. This represents a shift from the previous system where the Supreme Leader theoretically stood above the military. The Revolutionary Guards arrested key political opposition figures—including Azar Mansouri (head of Iran’s Reformist Front), Ebrahim Asgharzadeh (political committee head), and Mohsen Aminzadeh (former deputy foreign minister)—moves that clearly signal they are eliminating political rivals rather than deferring to civilian leadership.

Who Are the Revolutionary Guards and Why Are They Now in Control?

The Leadership Vacuum and Succession Crisis

When Khamenei’s airstrike death was confirmed, Iran faced a succession challenge that its constitutional framework was not designed to handle cleanly. The Supreme Leader is supposed to be selected by the Assembly of Experts, a 88-member body of senior clerics. However, no formal vote or announcement of Khamenei’s successor has occurred despite nearly a month passing since his death. The installation of Mojtaba Khamenei on March 9 appears to represent a temporary holding pattern rather than a permanent resolution—a signal that the actual succession remains contested or undecided among Iran’s various power centers.

This ambiguity itself is the point: with no Supreme Leader officially in place, no single civilian politician can claim ultimate authority, leaving the IRGC as the only institution with undisputed organizational coherence and command structure. However, if Mojtaba’s position remains undefined, it creates long-term instability. A formally installed Supreme Leader would theoretically be able to exercise checks on the IRGC’s power. The longer the succession remains unresolved, the more entrenched the IRGC’s control becomes. The risk is that if and when a new Supreme Leader is formally chosen, they may lack the authority or legitimacy to constrain an institution that has tasted unchecked power.

The Massive Human Cost of the Crackdown

The IRGC’s consolidation of power has been enforced through ruthless suppression of domestic opposition. In massive nationwide protests during December 2025 and January 2026, demonstrators demanded systemic change. The regime’s response was overwhelming: between 30,000 and 36,500 protesters were killed during the January 8-9, 2026 uprising alone, with over 7,000 confirmed deaths documented as of February 5, 2026. These are some of the deadliest protest suppression events in modern Iranian history.

The scale of casualties serves a dual purpose for the IRGC: it simultaneously crushes immediate opposition and sends a deterrent message to any future dissent. However, mass killings of civilians carry their own risks. When regimes resort to such extreme violence, it typically signals they have lost confidence in other forms of social control—a sign that underlying discontent remains widespread even if temporarily suppressed. The arrest of political opposition figures like Mansouri and Asgharzadeh suggests the IRGC views even moderate reformist voices as threats to their consolidated control, indicating they perceive broader political opposition even after the bloodshed.

Military Strain and Growing Institutional Friction

Iran’s armed forces are under severe stress that goes beyond normal military strain. The regular army (known as the Artesh) and the Revolutionary Guards have historically competed for resources and political influence, but current reports indicate rising desertions from the armed forces and acute supply shortages affecting military capability. The human toll of the January crackdown—where many soldiers and Guards were deployed to suppress protesters—may have contributed to morale collapse and desertions among personnel who witnessed or participated in mass killings.

The deepening friction between the Artesh and the IRGC reflects a fundamental problem for the regime: a military institution cannot indefinitely suppress its own population without degrading its fighting capacity and internal cohesion. As the IRGC tightens its grip on power, it may be inadvertently hollowing out Iran’s actual military capability, making it more vulnerable to external threats even as it dominates domestic politics. Desertions also suggest that not all military personnel accept the IRGC’s political dominance, though those dissidents currently lack any way to challenge it.

Economic Crisis Deepening Amid Power Struggle

Iran’s economy cannot absorb the cost of the power struggle and sustained military repression. The World Bank is projecting economic shrinkage in both 2025 and 2026, while annual inflation is rising toward 60 percent. Hyperinflation at that level destroys both savings and wages, pushing ordinary Iranians into desperation regardless of their political views.

Economic crisis was a major driver of the original protests, and the regime’s violent response has not solved the underlying economic problems—it has only temporarily prevented their public expression. This creates a vicious cycle: economic desperation drives discontent, the IRGC suppresses the resulting protests with overwhelming force, economic conditions worsen as the regime diverts resources to security operations, and discontent re-emerges when repression cannot be maintained indefinitely. The IRGC’s political control is now so complete that it can manage the expression of discontent, but it cannot manage the economic conditions generating it. If inflation continues accelerating and living standards collapse further, even the IRGC’s brutal security apparatus may eventually face pressure it cannot indefinitely sustain.

Economic Crisis Deepening Amid Power Struggle

International Response and Diplomatic Standoff

The United States and its allies have not remained passive observers of Iran’s internal convulsions. On March 23-24, 2026, Trump announced a postponement of U.S. military strikes on Iran’s power infrastructure, claiming this delay was intended to allow for negotiations. However, Iranian state media disputed Trump’s account, claiming that no such negotiations were actually occurring. This contradiction reveals the deep mistrust between the two sides and the absence of functional diplomatic channels. The threat of U.S.

military strikes targeting Iran’s power infrastructure adds another destabilizing layer to the IRGC’s consolidation of control. If the U.S. were to follow through on strikes against electrical grids or other critical infrastructure, it would likely strengthen the IRGC’s position domestically by rallying nationalist sentiment and justifying even harsher emergency measures. Conversely, if Trump’s negotiating claims are genuine, it suggests the U.S. may be exploring whether a new Iranian leadership structure might be more amenable to talks than Khamenei was. Either way, the external military threat is now entangled with Iran’s internal power struggle.

What Comes Next—Instability and Long-Term Risks

The current moment represents an unstable equilibrium rather than a settled new order. The IRGC has consolidated political power and suppressed immediate opposition through violence, but it has not resolved the underlying leadership succession, nor has it addressed the economic crisis that originally sparked protests. Mojtaba Khamenei’s undefined status could either evolve into formal Supreme Leader authority—in which case he would presumably attempt to reassert civilian-military balance—or it could remain frozen indefinitely, deepening IRGC dominance.

The coming months will likely reveal whether this power structure can hold. If a new Supreme Leader is formally installed and commands sufficient legitimacy, Iran might move toward a different equilibrium. If the succession remains unresolved and the IRGC continues consolidating control, Iran faces years of military rule masked by theocratic rhetoric. In either case, the combination of mass protest casualties, political arrests, military strain, economic collapse, and unresolved succession creates an extraordinarily volatile situation that could shift rapidly if any of these pressure points becomes critical.

Conclusion

Iran’s power struggle has entered a new phase with the Revolutionary Guards assuming consolidated control in the aftermath of Supreme Leader Khamenei’s death and the incomplete succession process. The human cost has been staggering—tens of thousands of protesters killed, key political figures arrested, and military morale collapsing under the weight of suppression operations. Meanwhile, the economy continues deteriorating toward hyperinflation, military desertions continue rising, and international tensions remain dangerously high with the specter of U.S. military strikes still unresolved.

The central question now is whether this IRGC-dominated system can stabilize or whether the combination of unresolved succession, economic crisis, and suppressed discontent will eventually destabilize it. History suggests that military institutions cannot indefinitely rule through force alone, particularly in the context of economic collapse. However, the IRGC has demonstrated ruthlessness and organizational capacity that should not be underestimated. The next crucial development will be whether Iran’s religious authorities formally appoint a new Supreme Leader and whether that person attempts to reassert civilian authority over the military, or whether the current arrangement becomes permanent.