The question of whether the Supreme Court is ready to block the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) from overreaching again is a complex and evolving issue that reflects broader tensions about the scope of federal regulatory power, judicial deference to agencies, and environmental policy priorities. Recent developments in the Supreme Court’s approach to EPA actions suggest a cautious but increasingly assertive stance toward limiting the agency’s authority when it appears to exceed statutory bounds or lacks clear congressional authorization.
At the heart of this debate is the Court’s ongoing recalibration of how much deference to give to federal agencies like the EPA when they interpret ambiguous environmental statutes. For decades, the landmark 1984 Chevron decision established a framework requiring courts to defer to reasonable agency interpretations of unclear laws, effectively granting agencies broad latitude to shape regulatory policy. However, this doctrine has faced growing criticism for enabling what some see as unchecked bureaucratic power, especially when agencies push the boundaries of their statutory mandates. The Supreme Court has recently signaled a willingness to revisit and potentially limit Chevron deference, particularly in cases involving significant questions of economic and political importance.
In the 2024-25 Supreme Court term, environmental law cases have brought these issues into sharp focus. One notable case involved challenges by states like Oklahoma and Utah to EPA disapprovals of state implementation plans under the Clean Air Act. The Court unanimously reversed a lower court ruling that had sided with the EPA, emphasizing that the EPA’s disapproval was a locally or regionally applicable action rather than a nationwide one. This distinction mattered because it constrained the EPA’s ability to impose broad, nationwide criteria without clear statutory backing. The Court’s decision reflected a careful, two-step framework for reviewing agency actions, scrutinizing whether the agency’s interpretation was reasonable and whether it was based on a proper understanding of the statute’s scope.
Interestingly, even among the justices, there is some divergence on how to apply these principles. Justice Gorsuch, for example, concurred in the judgment but expressed skepticism about the majority’s reasoning, highlighting the confusion and inconsistency in how courts handle mixed questions of law and fact in environmental cases. This signals that while the Court is ready to rein in EPA overreach, it is still grappling with the best doctrinal approach to do so consistently.
Beyond the specific cases, the Court’s broader attitude toward EPA authority is shaped by concerns about administrative overreach and the proper role of the judiciary in reviewing agency decisions. The EPA has faced criticism for aggressive enforcement tactics and for regulatory
